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Abstract 
The representativeness heuristic is a psychological bias which means that, under uncertainty, investors are prone to believe that a 
history of a remarkable performance of a given firm is “representative” of a general performance that the firm will continue to 
generate into the future. Investors subjects to this heuristic overreact, thus, to salient and similar information about firms past 
performance such as similar consecutive earnings surprises. I have examined this relationship on the Tunisian stock market using 
accounting and stock market data over the period 1990-2010. Weak evidence has been found concerning this relationship. The 
results show a partial association between past earnings surprises and future abnormal returns explained by negative earnings  
surprises autocorrelation. 
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1. Introduction  
Since the 80s, economists have begun to be more and more interested in psychology to explain the financial 
market participants’ behavior and some financial market anomalies. A new field called behavioral finance has 
therefore emerged as a mixture of psychology and finance to explain these anomalies. This term applies, according 
to Shiller (2000), to research on stock markets which accounts for all the components of the human behavior, 
including elements of psychology and sociology. This new approach reproaches the participants in financial markets 
for being irrational or, at least, to have a bounded rationality. 
One of the first forms of irrationality is the stock market overreaction documented by De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985). The overreaction is defined by these authors as the overweighting of unanticipated and dramatic 
information. It causes a return reversal and a negative auto-correlation over long horizons (beyond one year) 
challenging the efficient market hypothesis. Such behavior results from the fact that in decision-making, the 
majority of the individuals violates the law of Bayes rule and tend, consequently, to overweight the recent 
information to the detriment of the past information, a behavior which represents an example of a heuristic identified 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) called representativeness. 
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The term "heuristic" is defined by Grether (1992) as “a rule of thumb or decision aid by which individuals may 
judge likelihood”. The main conclusion of the psychological studies on heuristics shows that they bias the 
judgments of individuals and cause systematic errors. The representativeness heuristic is one of the most important 
heuristics documented by psychologists and adopted later by the behavioral finance proponents to explain some 
stock market anomalies and investor behavior (see, for example, Barberis, Shleifer &Vishny, 1998; Shefrin, 2008). 
Representativeness means, according to Kahneman and Tversky (1972), that in situations of uncertainty, people 
“evaluate the probability of an uncertain event, or sample, by the degree to which it is: (i) similar in essential 
properties to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by which it is generated”.  
In the stock markets, an investor subject to the representativeness heuristic interprets the past performance of 
firms as being representative of a general performance that the firm will continue to generate in the future. He can 
simply think that a firm having consecutive positive earnings surprise will continue to generate a similar 
performance although the past observed performance could not be representative of the company. Also, he can think 
that a firm having consecutive negative earnings surprise is a failed firm and will continue to generate weak 
performance. 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) were the first ones to have modeled this behavior to explain investors under 
and over-reaction in stock markets. In their investor sentiment model, the investor does not realize that earnings 
follow a random walk. Rather, he believes that they follow two regimes: a mean reversion (regime) 1 or a trend 
(regime) 2. An investor subject to the conservatism bias in face of an earnings announcement reacts partially to this 
announcement; that is, he believes that a shock in the earnings will be followed more probably by a negative shock 
according to regime 1. On the other hand, after a series of similar shocks, the investor applies the representativeness 
heuristic and uses the model 2 to anticipate the earnings of the next period by extrapolating the performance into the 
future. This means that he overreacts to a series of similar information. 
Although there are few studies exploring the contribution of the representativeness to explain the investor 
behavior, their empirical results are mixed. Some psychological and experimental studies show that this concept is 
not convenient to detect the individual behavior in real economic states (Grether, 1980, 1992; Charness, Karni & 
Levin, 2010). In contrast, other studies which lie within the behavioral finance approach find that this heuristic 
affects the investor’s decision when evaluating stocks (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Bloomfield & Hales, 
2002; Frieder 2004, 2008; Kaestner, 2006; Alwathainani, 2012).  
Furthermore, the impact of the representativeness heuristic remains limited to experimental studies carried out in 
laboratories under controlled conditions. Moreover, the few studies which examined this heuristic on stock markets 
with real data are limited to developed markets. To the best of our knowledge, this psychological bias has not been 
yet examined on emergent markets. I try, along with this study, to contribute to this debate by studying the impact of 
this heuristic on the Tunisian stock market behavior. In particular, I try to show whether representativeness heuristic 
causes overreaction to the accounting earnings information according to the behavioral finance theory. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a short psychological and financial 
literature review on the representativeness heuristic and the relation between this heuristic and investor overreaction. 
Section 3 explains the research design, section 4 presents the empirical findings and section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review  
2.1. Psychological and experimental literature 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972) and Tversky and Kahneman (1971, 1974, 1982a, 1982b) underline that the 
representativeness heuristic is used by individuals in several contexts and present a number of experiments 
supporting their hypothesis. They show that when people are asked to formulate judgments under uncertainty, most 
of them make mistakes because instead of constructing their answer from a logical and probabilistic reasoning, they 
proceed to a reasoning based on the representative information. They show that this heuristic causes judgment errors 
such as neglecting bias rate in violation of the bias rule, conjunction fallacy and applying law of small numbers. 
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Bloomfield and hales (2002), Bar Hillel and Wagenaar (1991), and Rapoport and Budescu (1992, 1997) show 
that people are more prone to expect that even short sequences resulting, for example, from coin flips or from 
drawings of balls from an urn or sequences representing firm earning changes contain proportions similar to the long 
sequences from which they are drawn (For a review of these studies and others, see Rabin, 2002). 
Grether (1980, 1992), Charness, Karni and Levin (2010) and Gigerenzer (2005) underlined that heuristics and biases 
deduced from experimental environment do not often represent the way in which the individuals make decisions in 
real environments with natural stimuli. However, financial studies like Barberis, Shleifer et Vishny (1998), Kaestner 
(2006), Frieder (2008) et Alwathainani (2012) show that representativeness affects investors’ behavior on stock 
markets and causes overreaction. 
2.2. Stock market studies 
To explain how representativeness causes overreaction, I will start with the overreaction definition provided by 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998). According to these authors, overreaction means that the average return 
following a series of announcements of good news (zt = G) is lower than the average return following a series of bad 
news announcements (zt = B): 
                            ) ..., , ,/( ) ..., , ,/( 1111 BzBzBzREGzGzGzRE jttttjtttt        , Where 1tj                (1) 
The explanation of this reversion is that after a series of good news, investors become overly optimistic that the 
future news announcements will be also good and, hence, overreact causing an overvaluation of the firm’s stock 
price. They will be desperate once subsequent news announcements do not confirm their prior optimism, which 
leads to a price decrease below its fundamental value and, then, to poor returns. This reversion means that the 
overweighting of bad (good) information leading to a decrease (increase) in prices below (above) their fundamental 
value is corrected in subsequent period.  
The explanation of the overreaction by the representativeness heuristic commonly provided by behaviorists (see 
for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) is as follows: When the investors realize that a firm has a history 
of either a remarkable or an exceptional performance (such as earnings or sales growth accompanied by an 
interesting description of its products and its management), they can deduce that such a history is representative of a 
good performance of the firm. Being unaware of the randomness of such a history, the investors believe that such a 
performance tends to be reproduced and that this firm will keep its earnings growth for a long time. Thus, they 
extrapolate its history far into the future. When anticipating the firm’s share price, they overestimate it. They will be 
disappointed later when the earnings growth does not materialize as they were expecting. Consequently, stock prices 
decrease and revert back to their fundamental value. 
To test the representativeness/overreaction hypothesis, Kaestner (2006) examined a sample of 4081 firms listed 
on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX over the period 1983-1999 and found that a series of similar past earnings 
surprises causes an increasing overreaction phenomenon which drives stock prices below their rational level after a 
series of negative past earnings surprises and above their rational level after a series of positive past earnings 
surprises. The magnitude of the market overreaction is positively related to the number of similar past earnings 
surprises, which means that investors tend to strongly extrapolate similar information under the representativeness 
effect. 
Frieder (2008) analyzed aggregate order imbalance for firms having consecutive same-sign earnings surprises 
over the period 1988-1998. She found that the average daily order imbalance innovation increases with the number 
of positive surprises indicating that the investors buy significantly more stocks after series of positive surprises. She 
also found that excessive stock purchasing based on past earnings surprises is followed subsequently by 
underperformance. She concluded that investors extrapolate past performance to the point that they overreact. 
Alwathainani (2012) found similar result based on series of similar past consecutive returns. He formed two 
portfolios : a consistent winner which includes firms that rank in the top 30% in terms of their returns over the past 
two, three and four months and a consistent loser which includes firms that persistently rank in the lowest quartile. 
He found for the period 1964-2008 that the consistent loser underperforms the consistent winner 1 year later, but 
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outperforms it 2, 3, 4 and 5 years later. The price reversals of the two portfolios increase with the length of the past 
series. 
On the Taiwanese stock market, Wu, Wu and Liu (2009) found weak evidence of the representativeness over the 
period 1988-2006. They report, rather, a short-term predictability (for 3 to 12 months) explained by underreaction to 
earnings announcement due to the conservatism bias. 
The explanation of the overreaction by representativeness relies on the concept of sentiment of excessive 
optimism or pessimism (see the definition above of overreaction provided by Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Several studies were interested in the impact of investor sentiment on the financial markets without associating it 
with the representativeness heuristics. In this paper I will try to show how representativeness causes optimism or 
pessimism and then, overreaction. 
3. Research design 
The main objective of this empirical research is to know whether the representativeness heuristic causes 
overreaction of the Tunisian stock market to the informational content of earnings. To do so, I proceed in two stages. 
In their definition of the overreaction, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) underlined the representativeness effect 
on the investor sentiment (its optimism or pessimism) which causes, in turn, an under-or overvaluation of stocks 
corrected subsequently by a reversion to its rational level. Thus, it would be appropriate to examine first the impact 
of unexpected earnings on the investor sentiment, source of this overreaction. This allows us to know if a series of 
unexpected earnings (or earnings surprises) creates a sentiment of optimism or pessimism that affects the investor 
judgment as regards to stock valuation.  
Given that a misevaluation (undervaluation or overvaluation) of stock price is corrected later, we should find a 
negative relation between a series of similar past earnings surprises and future stock returns. The second stage 
examines this relation. 
3.1. Impact of the representativeness heuristic on investor sentiment  
I formally state the first hypothesis of representativeness/sentiment as follows:  
H1: “The past unexpected earnings affect the sentiment of investors subjects to the representativeness heuristic”  
To test the impact of earnings surprises on investor sentiment, two methods will be adopted: (i) a Granger (1969) 
causality test between “earnings surprises” and “investor sentiment”; and (ii) an event study which examines the 
sentiment evolution following earnings announcement. 
3.1.1. Granger causality tests between unexpected earnings and investor sentiment  
To run Granger causality test between “unexpected earnings” and “investor sentiment indicator”, the following 
vector autoregression (VAR) is considered:  
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Where Sentt is the investor sentiment indicator measured by ARMS index and UEt, the unexpected earnings. 
If the representativeness affects the investor sentiment, one must expect that Only the variable “unexpected 
earnings” Granger causes “the investor sentiment”. Causality from the investor sentiment to the unexpected earnings 
or bidirectional causality will be considered as evidence against this hypothesis. 
The causality tests inform us only whether a series of earnings surprises has an impact on the investor sentiment, 
but it does not allow to identify the nature of the sentiment (i.e. whether it is optimism or pessimism), nor the 
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magnitude of this sentiment (i.e. whether it is excessive or not). These two characteristics could be highlighted 
through an event study. 
3.1.2. Event study  
Since the earnings of the most Tunisian companies are generally annual, the unexpected earnings computed must 
also be annual. I have, then, to calculate an annual indicator of sentiment to be able to test the preceding VAR 
model. However, the calculation of a sentiment indicator over a period as long as one year alters its precision, which 
can bias the results resulting from Granger causality test. So, I run an event study which allows to thoroughly 
calculate a sentiment indicator for various windows. The investor sentiment (ARMS index) is calculated T days after 
the earnings announcement (T = 5, 7, 10, 20, 30, 60, 90 and 120 days) and then, its average over the sample period. 
As mentioned above, the event study has the advantage to allow, based on the investor sentiment level, to judge if 
the Tunisian investor is optimistic or pessimistic about the firms’ future prospects and whether this optimism or 
pessimism is excessive (see interpretation of ARMS index in section 3.3.2).  
3.2. Impact of the representativeness heuristic on the investor behavior  
Under the effect of representativeness, similar information can be perceived as representative of a firm’s 
performance and extrapolated too far into the future. The investors subjects to this heuristic overestimate recent and 
salient information when evaluating the future performance of the firms. It means that they overreact to this 
information. Consequently, firms that have a long series of good (bad) news concerning unexpected earnings can 
exhibit a more significant overreaction and finish to be strongly overestimated (underestimated). According to 
Kaestner (2006), this effect implicitly assumes the existence of an external event that stops the overreaction 
behavior. Dealing with earnings news, this can be an announcement which infirms the investors’ expectation and 
generate, consequently, a reversion phenomenon. This reversion means that the past overreaction is subsequently 
corrected. Therefore, to examine whether the representativeness causes investor overreaction to new information, 
the two following hypotheses are tested. 
3.2.1. Investors’ overreaction to unexpected earnings  
The investors who apply the representativeness heuristics extrapolate their information far into the future. When 
these extrapolations are not confirmed by next earnings announcement, there should be later a reversal. After a 
positive surprise, the investors are expected to overestimate the next period earnings. On average, significant 
unexpected earnings should be followed, at the next earnings announcement date, by a correction of the initial 
overreaction, i.e. followed by Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) of the opposite sign. This hypothesis can be 
stated as follows:  
H2. "High unexpected earnings event causes an overreaction phenomenon followed by a performance reversal at 
the next earnings announcement”   
3.2.2. Increasing overreaction to similar unexpected earnings 
In their definition of the overreaction phenomenon, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) underlined that the 
source of overreaction is a series of similar information and not one piece of information. Similarly, Bloomfield and 
Hales (2002), Kaestner (2006), Alwathainani (2012) and Frieder (2008) have shown that the magnitude of the 
overreaction increases with the information persistence. It is thus, obvious, that a repeatedly-confirmed information 
affects the investor behavior more than the information communicated separately, because it creates in their minds, 
according to Kaestner (2006), an image more representative of the firm performance which affects their judgment of 
its future performance. Repeatedly confirmed information is, thus, extrapolated more strongly than less frequent 
information. Consequently, the longer the similar earnings surprise series, the stronger is the investor overreaction. 
It is, thus, appropriate to test the following hypothesis: 
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H3. “The longer the series of similar unexpected earnings, the higher the subsequent correction of biased prices 
will be”  
3.3. Data, methodology and descriptive statistics  
3.3.1. Data  
To test the preceding hypothesis, we need stock market data and accounting data. The stock market data are the 
daily stock price, the trading volume (number of shares traded in a day) and the number of outstanding shares of all 
the firms listed on the Tunisian stock market on the period January 1990 - June 2010. The accounting data are 
annual earnings, total assets and earnings announcement dates. For these data, I went back to 1986 to take account 
of the series of earnings change preceding the year of 1990. Over the period 1986-2010, I collected 770 annual 
earnings announcements.  
3.3.2. The variables  
Unexpected earnings  
The key element in the study of the representativeness impact on the stock market prices is the new information 
communicated by earnings. This new information takes the form of the unexpected earnings (or surprise). To isolate 
this information, empirical studies subtract the earnings expected by the market from the actual earnings. These 
studies often use consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings as proxy for the expected earnings. However, if the 
consensus analysts’ earnings are not available, Nichols and Wahlen (2004) recommend the use of prior-period 
earnings as an estimate of expected earnings. Earnings surprises or unexpected earnings are, then, proxied by 
earnings change: 
)n(E)n(EnE EU iii 1 '                                                    (3) 
Where UE denotes Unexpected Earnings, Ei(n) is the current earnings and Ei(n-1) is the prior period earnings of firm 
i. 
Following Nichols and Wahlen (2004), I use, also, earnings change per total assets to enhance the cross-sectional 
comparability of this measure. Firms are ranked into three groups conditional on this measure. 
1)-(nTA
nE UE
i
i '                                                                                    (4) 
Where UE is Unexpected Earnings; ΔEi(n), current earnings change; and TAi(n-1), prior year firm i’s total assets. 
The investor sentiment measure: ARMS index  
To measure the investor sentiment, I will use the ARMS index which is one of the most used technical indicators. 
In our study, we use only ARMS index as a sentiment indicator because the other indicators enumerated in the 
financial literature are not applicable to the Tunisian context, either because there are no data on these types of 
indicators such as those obtained from surveys or because there are no data allowing us to calculate some indicators 
such as the Put/Call ratio. 
Created by Richard Arms (1989), ARMS index at date T is defined as the ratio of the number of advancing stocks 
to the number of declining stocks standardized by their respective trading volume.  
tt
tt
tt
tt
t advNadvVol
decNdecVol
decVoldecN
advVoladvNARMS                                    (5) 
Where, N adv is the number of advancing stocks; Vol adv trading volume of advancing stocks; N dec, number of 
declining stocks and; Vol dec, trading volume of declining stocks. 
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ARMS index can be interpreted as the ratio of volume per declining stock to the volume per advancing stock 
(Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006). It indicates that when the average trading volume of declining stocks exceeds 
the average trading volume of advancing stocks (i.e. ARMS>1), the market is oversold. On the other hand, if the 
average trading volume of rising stocks exceeds the average trading volume of decreasing stocks (ratio ARMS<1), 
the market is overbought (Brown and Cliff, 2004, 2005 and; Wang, Keswani and Taylor, 2006).  
Abnormal returns  
To compute the abnormal returns I use, according to Foster, Olsen and Shevlin (1984), Bernard and Thomas 
(1989), Nichols and Wahlen (2004) and Kaestner (2006), a size-adjustment approach. At the beginning of each year, 
I group the firms in three portfolios based on their market value (a stock's price times shares outstanding), and I 
calculate the equally-weighted return of each portfolio which noted Rsize,t. For each stock, the abnormal return at date 
t is the difference between the stock return at date t and the equally-weighted return of the portfolio to which it 
belongs at the beginning of the year. 
tsizetiti RRAR ,,,                                                                                    (6) 
Where; Ri,t is stock i’s return at time t and Rsize,t is the equally weighted return of the portfolio “size” to which the 
stock i belongs at the beginning of the year. 
The abnormal returns are then cumulated over the period following and including the earnings announcement 
date: 
¦  Tt t,ii AR)T(CAR 0                                                                             (7) 
T is the length (expressed in days or months) of the period over which the abnormal returns are cumulated after (and 
including) the earnings announcement date.  
I use daily and monthly observation for the abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns. Theoretically, daily 
observations are appropriate for event studies because they allow observing the market reaction following earnings 
announcement with higher precision than in the case of monthly frequency. I also use monthly data to avoid certain 
measurement problems that can arise with the use of daily data such as the "bid-ask" effect and the consequences of 
infrequent trading.  
3.3.3. Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the annual variables and for daily and monthly abnormal returns 
for some windows T. The statistics corresponding to the earnings and earnings change, for example, indicate that 
during most of the sample period, firms were profitable. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
Panel A. Annual Sample  
Market Value (Million TND) 85.859 115.446 17.040 37.590 114.051 
Earnings (Million TND) 5.376 13.988 1.049 2.895 7.669 
Earnings changes (Million TND) 0.614 14.278 -0.321 0.334 1.317 
Total Assets (Million TND) 1075.881 12658.888 40.960 92.870 778.761 
(ΔE)/T.A 0.007 0.113 -0.003 0.002 0.010 
Panel B. Monthly variables 
Returns 0.0032 0.1242 -0.0278 0.0000 0.0358 
AR(9 months) 0.0000 0.1091 -0.0353 -0.0004 0.0374 
CAR (9 months) -0.0002 0.2616 -0.0760 0.0133 0.1103 
Panel C. Daily variables  
AR (10 days) 0.0000 0.0235 -0.0043 0.0001 0.0059 
AR (30 days) 0.0000 0.0343 -0.0040 0.0002 0.0055 
AR (60 days) 0.0000 0.0318 -0.0040 0.0000 0.0049 
CAR (10 days) 0.0004 0.0528 -0.0154 0.0000 0.0179 
CAR (30 days) 0.0005 0.0963 -0.0281 0.0013 0.0324 
CAR (60 days) 0.0008 0.1622 -0.0382 0.0038 0.0555 
Notes: Market Value is the stock's price at the beginning of the year times number of shares outstanding. Earnings change is the 
difference between current year earnings and prior year earnings. The annual Sample includes 770 earnings announcements on 
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period 1986-2010. AR and CAR are Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns, respectively, computed for various 
event windows. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1. Does the representativeness affect the investor sentiment? 
4.1.1. Causality test  
The parameters of VAR can only be estimated on stationary time series. The stationarity test of the two series 
"ARMS" and "earnings change" shows that they are stationary in level. 
Table 2 presents the results of Wald tests for optimal lag equal to 2 (based on Schwarz criterion) performed to 
test, first, the null hypothesis that for example β11=β12=0, second, the null hypothesis that the sum of estimated 
coefficients, for example β11+β12, is equal to zero. The sum of the unexpected earnings coefficients in the first 
equation of the VAR model represents the cumulative effect of lagged unexpected earnings on the investor 
sentiment. The first test is a joint test which examines the simultaneous significance of many coefficients in an 
equation. The second test examines whether the sum of these estimated coefficients are significantly different from 
zero. F1 and F2 statistics are used to test these null hypotheses, respectively (Tests based on χ2 statistics give similar 
results). The p-value is the probability of each statistic under the null hypothesis. 
The first column of the table displays F statistic for the unexpected earnings coefficients and their corresponding 
probabilities. It shows that the null hypothesis “The unexpected earnings do not Granger cause ARMS index” is 
rejected at the 5% level. In the same way, the second test indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected since the 
probabilities of the corresponding test statistics (4.44%) are lower than 5%. There is, thus, a significant positive 
cumulative effect of lagged earnings surprises on the ARMS index which indicates that a series of past earnings 
surprise affects significantly the investor sentiment. In addition, the estimate of the second equation shows that the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional significance level implying that “investor sentiment” (ARMS 
index) does not Granger cause “earnings surprises”. Thus, the investor sentiment measured by ARMS index does 
not provide any useful information content to forecast unexpected earnings. 
Similar results, available on request, were found for lags 1 and 3. In sum, these results show that the 
representativeness can affect the mood of the Tunisian investors by creating a sentiment of optimism or pessimism 
which can cause overreaction to earnings announcement. 
 
Table 2. Granger Causality between earnings surprises and investor sentiment 
 
Dependent variable ARMSt   ΔEt  
Independent variable ∆Et-j ARMSt-j  ∆Et-j ARMSt-j 
F1 [p-value] 6.2397 
[0.0139] 
0.5560 
[0.5876] 
 0.0380 
[0.9628] 
0.1908 
[0.8287] 
Sum of lagged coefficients 20.5653 -0.1928  0.0083 -0.0128 
F2 [p-value] 5.0409 
[0.0444] 
0.2584  
[0.6204] 
 0.0002 
[0.9874] 
0.3624 
[0.5584] 
           361.02  R               -0.2742  R  
     Prob(F) = 0.0497          Prob(F) = 0.9647 
Notes: ∆Et-j is the unexpected earnings compounded as the value-weighted earnings change of firms selected at each period. F1 and 
F2 are obtained from a Wald test: The F1 test statistic is a joint test of the null hypothesis based on Granger causality restrictions. p-
value is the probability of the F statistic under the null hypothesis. The F2 test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that the sum 
of the estimated coefficients is equal to zero. p-value is the probability of the F2 test statistic under the null hypothesis. 
4.1.2. Event study  
Table 3 presents the evolution of the investor sentiment measured by ARMS index after earnings announcement. 
The ARMS index is always significantly different from 0 for various windows, confirming the impact of the 
unexpected earnings on the investor sentiment deduced from the causality test. The index is always higher than 1 
indicating a sentiment of pessimism. This means that the Tunisian investors are not generally satisfied with the 
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announced earnings. This sentiment is excessive 20 and 30 days after earnings announcement where volume per 
decreasing stock is almost twice the volume per increasing stock. 
 
Table 3. ARMS index d days following earnings announcement date  
 
Days 5 d 7 d 10 d 20 d 30 d 60 d 90 d 120 d 
ARMS 1.369 1.386 1.282 1.846 1.899 1.422 1.496 1.437 
 (5.87) (4.22) (5.21) (4.60) (3.96) (5.59) (3.59) (4.76) 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
 In Sum, results based on causality test and event study confirm our first hypothesis according to which the 
representativeness affects the investor sentiment. 
Now, I am going to examin the reaction of the market to one earnings surprise and to a series of similar earnings 
surprises. 
4.2. Does the representativeness explain the investors’ overreaction to earnings surprises?   
4.2.1. Impact of a past surprise on the market reaction  
To test the second hypothesis, firms are grouped in two portfolios based on their past earnings change, ΔE(n -1). 
The first portfolio (P+) consists of the firms having a positive earnings change and the second one (P -) consists of 
those having a negative earnings change. Firms are also ranked based on earnings change to total assets, ΔE(n-
1)/TA, where P1 is the portfolio of the 1/3 of firms having the highest past earnings change per total assets and P3 is 
the portfolio of the 1/3 of firms having the lowest past earnings change per total assets. Abnormal returns are, then, 
cumulated starting from the next earnings announcement date. Abnormal return of a portfolio is the equally 
weighted abnormal returns of the stocks belonging to it. I calculate the average of the cumulative abnormal returns 
across all the 20 years in my sample period.  
The hypothesis H2 states, as explained previously, that the current cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, should be 
of the opposite sign to the past earnings surprise, ΔE (n-1). The results obtained with monthly cumulative abnormal 
returns (table 4) partially confirm this hypothesis. It was found that only those corresponding to the firms having 
extremely positive earnings change (tercile 1 obtained based on ΔE/TA) are significant and of the opposite sign than 
the lagged variable ΔE(n-1)/TA. After an extremely positive surprise, the investors seem to be disappointed about 
the recent earnings, which results in significant negative cumulative abnormal returns varying from -0.76% (t = -
1.76) at the month of announcement to -3.54 % (t = -2.12) nine months after the announcement date. The profit of a 
contrarian strategy which consists in buying stocks having experienced extreme negative earnings changes, selling 
those having experienced extreme positive earnings changes, and reversing these positions later, is positive, but not 
significant. The absence of significance is probably due to the non reversal of the performance of the firms having 
experienced extreme negative earnings (portfolio 3). This partial reversion is in line with the results of Frieder 
(2008) who finds that investors extrapolate mainly positive earnings surprises into the future. 
 
Table 4. Monthly cumulative abnormal returns following past unexpected earnings 
 
  ΔE    ΔE/TA  
Prtf P+ P- P- - P+  P1 P3 P1- P3 
CAR(0) -0.10% -0.29% -0.19%  -0.76%* -0.35% 0.41% 
CAR(1) -0.19% -0.33% -0.14%  -1.92% 0.54% 2.45% 
CAR(2) -0.29% -1.62% -1.33%  -2.53%* -0.51% 2.03% 
CAR(3) -0.33% -2.53% -2.20%  -3.26%* -1.87% 1.39% 
CAR(4) 0.01% -2.37% -2.39%  -3.04%* -1.81% 1.23% 
CAR(5) -0.12% -2.37% -2.25%  -3.46%** -1.83% 1.64% 
CAR(6) 0.10% -2.03% -2.13%  -3.21%* -2.17% 1.04% 
CAR(7) 0.45% -1.87% -2.32%  -2.77% -2.54% 0.24% 
CAR(8) 0.15% -1.95% -2.10%  -2.79%* -2.92% -0.13% 
CAR(9) -0.21% -0.78% -0.57%  -3.54%** -1.69% 1.84% 
CAR(10) 0.26% -1.76% -2.02%  -2.83%* -1.82% 1.02% 
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CAR(11) 0.24% -0.91% -1.15%  -4.17%** -1.55% 2.62% 
CAR(12) 0.67% -1.32% -1.99%  -3.52% -1.64% 1.88% 
Notes. Stocks are ranked based on past unexpected earnings, UEn-1. Unexpected earnings are measured by earnings changes ΔE or by 
earnings changes scaled by lagged total assets ΔE/TA. The later is used for cross-sectional comparability. P+ and P- are portfolios of all 
firms having positive past earnings change and those having past negative earnings change, respectively. P1 (P3) is the portfolio of the 
1/3 of firms having the highest (lowest) past earnings change per total assets. Cumulative abnormal returns are obtained by summing 
monthly abnormal returns for each window following and including the earnings announcement date and averaged across all 19 years in 
our sample period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % level respectively. 
This result seems to partially confirm the representativeness hypothesis as a potential explanation to the 
overreaction phenomenon on the Tunisian stock market. However, it does not exclude, according to Kaestner 
(2006), the fact that abnormal returns are a purely rational response to the current unexpected earnings. This is the 
case if the successive earnings surprises are negatively correlated; i.e. after a positive surprise, there will be on 
average a negative current surprise followed by negative abnormal returns. Bernard and Thomas (1989), for 
example, found an earnings surprises’ autocorrelation in the American context.  
Table 5 presents the coefficient of correlation ρ between the current earnings surprises and the past earnings 
surprises for lags 1, 2, 3 and 4. ΔE/TA does not seem to provide a conclusive result which can be considered in our 
analysis since none of the autocorrelation coefficients is significantly different from zero. However, when the 
earnings surprises are measured by earnings changes, a significant negative autocorrelation is found between ΔEn 
and ΔEn-1 of -0.411(t = 11.451). For lag 2, this autocorrelation is weak but significant, -0.102 (t = 2.477). 
Consequently, the partial reversal observed previously is rational and cannot be explained by the representativeness 
heuristic. 
Table 5. Earnings surprises autocorrelation 
 
Unexpected Earnings (n ; n-1) (n ; n-2) (n ; n-3) (n ; n-4) 
ΔE/TA -0.033 
(0.790) 
-0.008 
(0.186) 
0.001 
(0.031) 
-0.033 
(0.690) 
ΔE -0.411 
(11.451) 
-0.102 
(2.477) 
-0.057 
(1.298) 
-0.059 
(1.281) 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
4.2.2. Impact of a series of similar past surprises on the market reaction  
The objective of this section is to examine the link between a series of similar surprises and the future returns. 
This enables us to identify, as underlined by Kaestner (2006), the marginal impact of an additional similar past 
surprise on the overreaction magnitude. If this overreaction is due to the representativeness, then the investors would 
not only extrapolate a one earnings change in the future, but he would also strongly react to a series of similar 
surprises. If the investors use the representativeness heuristic, one must expect that the subsequent reversion is more 
pronounced for the events having a long series of good or bad surprises.  
Table 6 displays the monthly cumulative abnormal returns following current earnings surprise preceded by 
earnings surprise of the opposite sign. The sign " + " corresponds to a positive earnings surprise. The sign " - " 
corresponds to a negative earnings surprise. The second column (P+) represents the cumulative abnormal returns 
following a positive current earnings surprise. We continue with only earnings change as proxy of earnings surprises 
to get maximum number of firms matching the criteria of 1, 2 and 3 similar past earnings. The sixth column (P-) 
presents the cumulative abnormal returns following a negative current earnings surprise. Note that the cumulated 
abnormal returns are of the same sign than the current surprise and are, generally significant. This positive 
association between the current earnings surprise and the abnormal returns, which indicate that stock returns are 
adjusted in the same direction that the earnings surprise, corroborate the results found by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Nichols and Wahlen (2004) on the American stock market. 
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Table 6. Monthly cumulative abnormal returns following a series of similar past unexpected earnings 
 
 Positive ΔE preceded by 1, 2 or 3 negative ΔE   Negative ΔE preceded by 1, 2 or 3 positive ΔE 
Prtf P+ P- + P- - + P- - - +  P- P+ - P+ + - P+ + + - 
CAR(0) 0.55%** 1.65%** 2.05% 1.64%  -1.38%*** -0.83% 1.03% 1.75% 
CAR(1) 0.81%* 2.49%* 3.71%** 4.78%  -1.15% -0.86% 2.61% 5.24%** 
CAR(2) 0.97% 1.92% 1.71% 4.46%  -1.26% -0.54% 1.73% 6.44%** 
CAR(3) 1.27%* 0.48% 0.50% -0.01%  -2.35% -2.83% 1.11% 4.84% 
CAR(4) 1.07% -0.33% 1.06% -3.00%  -2.01% -2.30% 2.48% 6.25%* 
CAR(5) 1.54%** -0.09% 0.54% -0.96%  -3.00%** -4.44% -0.20% 4.66% 
CAR(6) 1.76%** 0.38% 1.47% 1.91%  -3.06%* -4.29% 0.55% 4.12% 
CAR(7) 1.75%** 1.87% 3.63% 7.56%  -2.50% -2.05% 2.23% 4.32% 
CAR(8) 2.58%*** 4.33% 7.00% 9.03%  -4.59%*** -3.68% 2.00% 4.77% 
CAR(9) 2.73%*** 6.24% 7.96% 11.19%  -5.04%*** -5.04%* -1.20% 3.60% 
Notes. Firms are first ranked based on current earnings changes ΔEn. P+ (P-) is portfolio of all firms having a positive (negative) current 
earnings change. Second, Other Portfolios are formed conditional on the number of similar past earnings changes : P- +, P- - + and P- - - + 
are portfolios of firms having current positive surprise preceded by 1, 2 and 3 negative surprises, respectively and  P+ -, P+ + - and P+ + + -  
are portfolios of firms having current negative surprise preceded by 1, 2 and 3 positive surprises, respectively. Cumulative abnormal returns 
are obtained by summing monthly abnormal returns for each window following and including the earnings announcement date and averaged 
across all 19 years in our sample period. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % level respectively 
P- +, P - - + and P - - - + are the portfolios of firms having a positive current surprise preceded by one, two and 
three negative surprises, respectively. P+ -, P+ + - and P+ + + - are the portfolios of firms having a negative current 
earnings surprise preceded, respectively, by one, two and three positive surprises. The results presented in this table 
do not sufficiently support the hypothesis H3 for three reasons: 
i) We must focus, first of all, on firms having a series of bad news for the following reasons.  Recall that the 
causality test revealed a significant cumulative effect of two past surprises (for an optimal lag p = 2) on the investor 
sentiment (see table 2) and that the event study indicated that the investor sentiment reigning on the Tunisian stock 
market is, in general, a sentiment of pessimism (see table 3). Therefore, one must expect that after two negative past 
surprises the investors become excessively pessimistic and consequently, they overreact to this series of bad news 
by causing an undervaluation of the shares of these firms. If these two negative surprises are followed by a positive 
surprise, the investors revise their anticipations, resulting in a price increase and, hence, in positive returns. Column 
4 of table 6 shows that the cumulative abnormal returns are positive but significantly different from zero only 1 
month after a positive earnings surprise (CAR(1) = 3.71% (t = 2.18)).  
 ii) The degree of the investor overreaction does not generally increase with the length of the series of earnings 
surprises. The only exceptions correspond to the abnormal returns at the month of announcement (T = 0) and one 
month after earnings announcement (T = 1) for the firms having a positive current earnings surprise. In the month of 
announcement, the reaction of the market following a positive current surprise preceded by a negative past surprise 
is higher than that of only one positive current surprise (1.65% > 0.55%). One month later, the abnormal returns 
increase from 0.81% (t = 1.65) for a positive current surprise to 2.49% (t = 1.85) for a positive current surprise 
preceded by a negative surprise, then, to 3.71% (t = 2.18) for a positive current surprise preceded by 2 negative 
surprises. For 3 negative surprises, the reaction of the market is higher but not significant, probably because of the 
low number of the firms belonging to this portfolio (i.e. firms having jointly a positive surprise preceded by three 
negative surprises).  
iii) The abnormal returns of firms having negative current surprises are not significant when a negative surprise is 
preceded by one or more positive surprises.  
These results do not corroborate those of Kaestner (2006) on the American market, do not support the 
experimental study of Bloomfield and Hales (2002) and do not validate the model of Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) in the Tunisian context.  
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5. Conclusion  
The representativeness heuristic means that, under uncertainty, the investors tend to believe that a history of a 
remarkable performance of a given firm is “representative” of a general performance that the firm will continue to 
generate in the future. The investors subjects to this heuristic react with a sentiment of excessive optimism 
(pessimism) to a series of good (bad) news and extrapolate, thus, the past performance of the firm into the future by 
causing stock overvaluation (undervaluation). This means they overreact to similar information. The objective of 
this paper was to examine this link on the Tunisian stock market by focusing on accounting earnings announcement 
as an event that could cause a potential overreaction. 
Although the representativeness heuristic affects the investor sentiment (by creating a sentiment of pessimism), I 
have found a weak evidence supporting the hypothesis according to which this sentiment explains the investors 
overreaction to the informational content of earnings. Rather, the negative earnings surprises autocorrelation 
predicts a rational behavior.  
In this paper, I tried to explain the investor overreaction by the representativeness heuristic. However, the 
behavioral literature refers to two other biases which can account for it: the self-attribution and the overconfidence 
(see, for example, Gervais and Odean, 2001; Chuang and Lee, 2006; Darrat, Zhong and Cheng, 2007; and Chou and 
Wang, 2011). This literature suggests that investors overreact to their private information and underreact to public 
information. Thus, it would be appropriate to explore this perspective. 
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